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Trends in Procedural Law*
EDSON R. SUNDERLANDt
THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
It is quite possible that the most significant development in
procedural law will prove to be the fundamental change which is
taking place in the role of the legal profession.
No one would seriously assert that society has been content
with the way in which courts and lawyers have performed their
functions. Its criticisms have necessarily been directed to the
general effectiveness of legal proceedings, rather than to the na-
ture of the particular methods employed. Laymen have no way of
knowing what is wrong with a technical mechanism. But they
have been convinced that procedural law has not produced satis-
factory results, and they have unhesitatingly laid the blame upon
the legal profession.
There appears at first sight to be an element of unfairness in
this accusation, because procedural law, like other law, is under
the ultimate control of the legislature, which directly represents
the public, not the legal profession. If judges and lawyers are
forced to use a procedure imposed upon them by legislation, they
ought not to be held responsible for its shortcomings.
But the argument here suggested will not bear close inspec-
tion. In the first place, the profession was never able to show
whether or to what extent responsibility for poor results should
be assigned to those who made the rules rather than to those who
used them. The best rules might be crippled by a too technical
administration on the part of the judges, and might be used as in-
struments of annoyance and oppression by lawyers with too little
regard for their obligations as ministers of justice. In the second
place, since lawyers not only constitute a very influential group
in the community, but are always found in relatively large num-
bers among the members of legislative assemblies, it was difficult
for the public to understand why, if the fault lay with the rules,
the lawyers should not, with their superior technical knowledge
* This article is based on a paper which was delivered on April 7, 1938, at
the Dedication of Leche Hall, Law Building of the Louisiana State University
Law School.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
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and skill, contribute more to the improvement of legislation in
the field of procedural law.
The public, therefore, rejected the plea by which the profes-
sion sought to avoid responsibility. This meant that the profession
must either admit the charge of failure to perform its duties or
must itself lead the way toward a reform of our procedural sys-
tem which would make it responsive to the needs of modem so-
ciety.
The choice seems definitely to have been made, and the pro-
fession is assuming more and more responsibility for providing
an adequate and satisfactory administration of justice. This seems
to me to mark the most significant of the modern trends in proce-
dural law. A hundred years ago in England it was the public
which was waging a long war for the reform of legal procedure
against a hostile and entrenched profession.1 Today in the United
States it is the lawyers who are actively seeking, through their
national, state and local organizations, and with the constant aid
of the law schools, by every means at their command, to demon-
strate that justice can be administered without the delays, the
expense and the uncertainties of which the public has so long
complained. 2
When we examine the means by which the profession is
seeking to improve the quality of judicial administration, it is
clear that their efforts cover an extraordinarily wide range. They
have attacked the problem of the organization of both the courts
and the bar; they have re-examined the character of the services
which the courts ought to render; they have analyzed the various
sources of regulatory rules; and they have devised new methods
of meeting the age-old problems of pleading and preparation for
trial. What are the more important trends observable in this no-
table effort on the part of the bar?
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS
At the very foundation of the administration of justice lies
the problem of the organization of the courts. It is a double prob-
lem, and relates on the one hand to administrative direction within
the court, and on the other to the relations which different courts
in the judicial system bear to one another.
1. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform (1926) 39
Harv. L. Rev. 725.
2. For example: Rutherford, The Influence of the American Bar Asso-
ciation on Public Opinion and Legislation (1937); Martin, The Role of the Bar
in Electing the Bench in Chicago (1936).
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(a) Administrative Direction
As courts are commonly organized, no judge is subject to the
direction of any other nor of all the others together. Each is
separately appointed or elected and has an individual status,
which renders him independent of the rest. Cooperation between
them is purely a matter of personal choice and voluntary consent,
and it varies from time to time in accordance with changes in
personnel and current views of political expediency. No organi-
zation so destitute of centralized responsibility could be expected
to function vigorously.
So far as the judges are concerned, it is impossible to main-
tain or equalize loads, eliminate duplications of effort, assign cases
to those best qualified to deal with them, or develop expert per-
formance through specialization, unless all the members of the
court are subject to some administrative direction. This could be
exercised through a presiding judge whose selection and tenure
of office are not under the control of the judges whose work he
directs, and who is sufficiently relieved of judicial duties to be
able to devote an adequate amount of time and attention to the
management of the business of the court.
Definite measures are being advocated and definite steps have
been taken to develop an internal unity of direction and control of
this kind over all the activities of the court. The movement has
progressed further in large metropolitan communities than in the
states at large, because the pressure of litigation in congested
areas makes the need for administrative organization more ob-
vious8
But the advantages of state-wide unification of judicial action
are almost equally important. Judicial personnel is distributed
over the state in accordance with fixed geographical lines, which
perhaps once had some relation to the amount of local judicial
business., But population and business activity in the various
judicial districts constantly change, while judicial offices once
created tend to continue forever. The distribution of the load
among the judges of the state therefore tends to assume an almost
fantastic irregularity. In the report of the Judicial Council of
Michigan for 19374 it appeared that the trial load among the judges
3. Detroit's Common Pleas Court (1932) 16 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 117; Court
Supervision Wins in Cleveland (1928) 12 Id. 11; Best Organization for a Large
City Court (1934) 18 id. 41; Plan to Integrate Washington Judicature (1936)
19 id. 147.
4. Statistics are given in each annual report of the Judicial Council of
Michigan showing the trial load carried by each judge in the state during the
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of the various judicial circuits varied from 13 cases per judge per
year to 236 cases per judge per year. Such discrepancies, if they
cannot be removed by rearrangement of judicial districts, and
political considerations may make this impossible, can be substan-
tially reduced by the temporary assignment of judges in the light
circuits to aid those in the heavy circuits. This is a task for a
state-wide agency, which in some states is being provided in the
form of a presiding judge and in others in the form of a judicial
council. The Ashurst bill,5 introduced in the seventy-fifth Con-
gress, proposed to provide a very substantial degree of adminis-
trative unity for the United States district courts.
(b) Organization of the Court System
When we look beyond the institution which we call a court
and examine its relations to other courts in the system, we find an
amazing complexity and confusion in the distribution of judicial
power. In practically all states, for example, we have separate
courts for large and small cases, with an arbitrary line of division
between them. We usually have separate courts of first instance
and of review. We frequently have separate courts of probate,
separate criminal courts, separate courts of equity, and separate
courts for causes arising in certain localities. We often apportion
jurisdiction of the same kind among several different courts, each
exercising only a designated and restricted part of it, as where
certain appeals must be taken to one reviewing court and other
appeals to another. Sometimes we establish different courts with
concurrent jurisdiction in certain classes of cases and exclusive
jurisdiction in others. It is not uncommon to find a large number
of municipal courts, in the various cities of the same state, hardly
any two of which exercise the same jurisdiction. And as a final
complication, the legislature is constantly shifting and changing
the jurisdiction of the various courts, every change involving
more or less litigation to construe the meaning and ascertain the
effect of the legislative act.
Now, it is a principle of our law that whenever a case gets
into a court which lacks jurisdiction to deal with it, every act
done in connection with the case is a nullity, and any order or
judgment which may have been rendered is utterly void because
beyond the power of the court. The parties may have tried in
good faith to take their case to the proper court and may believe
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they have done so, the judge may suppose that he is authorized
to proceed with it. Statutes relating to jurisdiction are often
vague, uncertain and difficult to apply, and in spite of the greatest
caution the best lawyers and judges make mistakes. But neither
good faith nor diligence, nor even the precedent of established
practice, will ordinarily be of any avail, nor can anything be done
to correct or cure the error. The mistake is fatal. It has even been
held that if the plaintiff has once demanded a larger sum than
the court has authority to grant, he cannot save his case by re-
ducing the claim to an amount within the competence of the
court. The case has been irrevocably ruined by the original error
and no amendment can save it.6
Such serious consequences of an error in selecting the court
in which relief is sought are by no means necessary, and they
could easily be avoided. Cases ought never to fail at any stage by
reason of jurisdictional errors, if there is power anywhere to deal
with them. They should simply be transferred into the proper
tribunal when the error is discovered, with no loss as to any pro-
ceedings already had. If the mistake is not discovered before
judgment, that judgment should be just as valid for all purposes
as though it had been rendered by the proper court. In other
words, statutory provisions as to the distribution of business
should be made directory only, and never mandatory. There will
be safeguards enough against confusion of the legislative plan
for doing judicial business, because either party can raise the
point at will and the judges would be expected to allow no gen-
eral break-down of the scheme of distribution. Such a rule for
saving jurisdiction would prevent many accidental miscarriages
of justice and reduce the risk which now makes litigation one of
the most hazardous of occupations.
England led the way in eliminating jurisdictional hazards.
All the superior courts were made divisions of a single great
court, and the sole consequence of starting a case in the wrong
division was a removal to the proper one.7
In the United States there is a distinct trend toward an escape
from the tradition that getting into the wrong court is a monstrous
sort of error which ruins the case beyond redemption, and that
nothing remains but to hold the entire proceeding null and void
from the beginning. Thus, in New Jersey an act was passed in
6. Pecos & North Texas Ry. Co. v. Canyon Coal Co., 102 Tex. 478, 119 S.W.
294 (1909).
7. 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66, §§ 3, 35, 36.
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1912 prohibiting the dismissal of any action pending in any of
the four superior courts, on the ground of want of jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, but requiring instead that the cause
should be transferred, together with the record and files, to the
proper court to be proceeded with as though originally begun
there.8 And two years later an amendment provided that on any
appeal taken in a cause that had not been transferred, the judg-
ment should not be affected thereby, but the appellate court
should decide the appeal and direct the appropriate decree or
judgment to be entered by the court to which it should have been
transferred.9 In Michigan such a transfer is authorized between
the law and chancery divisions of the circuit court. 0
Professional opinion is steadily growing in favor of the estab-
lishment of a single unified court in the state, organized into ap-
propriate operating divisions, such as a county court division for
small causes, a district court division for other causes, and a su-
preme court division for appeals, with provision for transfer of
cases from one division to another to preserve the statutory dis-
tribution of functions.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BAR
Hardly less important than the organization of the courts is
the organization of the bar. Qualifications for membership are not
satisfactory, but there is a growing realization of the need for
better standards of admission. The weakness in the present situa-
tion is shown by the amazingly large number who come to the
bar with only the superficial training of commercialized schools.
There is, however, a very definite trend in the direction of closer
cooperation between the American Bar Association, the state bar
associations, the state boards of law examiners, and the better law
schools, in improving the safeguards against the admission of un-
desirable candidates.
But it is not enough to' close the doors to applicants who
should not enter. There must exist somewhere an adequate con-
trol of those who have been admitted. Where should that control
be lodged?
In England, from which we inherited most of our judicial in-
stitutions, the problem was a comparatively simple one. The Eng-
lish bar was always a fully self-governing organization. The Inns
8. N. J. Laws, 1912, ch. 283.
9. N. J. Laws, 1915, ch. 13.
10. C. L., 1929, § 14,008.
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of Court controlled, their own membership, and that membership
constituted membership in the bar. The courts had no power
either to admit or disbar, and Parliament never assumed any au-
thority to determine the right to practice law.1' With the entire
matter resting in the bar itself, as organized in the form of the
various Inns, it was merely a problem of internal administration
to keep out undesirable applicants and to expel those who ap-
peared unworthy of retaining their membership.
In France, likewise, where the bar has complete disciplinary
power over its members, the profession stands high in public
esteem, and cases of misconduct are so rare that professional
ethics presents no problem of public importance. 12
In the United States this simple and effective plan of main-
taining the standards of the profession has not been available, for
the bar has had no legal right of self-government. It has there-
fore been driven to employ a number of expedients for enforcing
proper conduct on the part of its members, which have proved
very inadequate.
Grievance committees are seldom effective, for two reasons:
(1) They lack power to investigate by compelling the attendance
of witnesses and putting them under oath, and (2) they have no
power of discipline.
Disbarment proceedings, on the other hand, are unsuitable be-
cause they are too drastic. Such proceedings are too much like
criminal prosecutions. Their publicity is so damaging that a
mere accusation will destroy a man's professional career. Their
penalties are so severe that they are never brought except as a
last resort. They have no flexibility, which will enable them to
be adjusted to various degrees of dereliction, actual or potential,
or to be used as deterrents at the first manifestation of a tendency
to stray from the straight and narrow path.
Confronted with the impossible task of effectively controlling
the conduct of the bar by means of these utterly inadequate de-
vices, the ingenuity of American lawyers brought forward the
proposal of an integrated state bar, clothed with disciplinary
powers over its members.
The California State Bar is the outstanding example of this
type of organization. Power to discipline rests ultimately in the
Board of Governors, but complaints are first heard by local com-
11. 2 Halsbury's Laws of England (1908) 358-366.
12. Appleton, Trait, de la Profession d'Avocat (1923) 123-150, 441-483.
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mittees, at private hearings, with full power to summon wit-
nesses. Unless they recommend action by the Board of Gover-
nors, and the latter decide in favor of imposing discipline, no
public notice of the complaint and hearing, is ever given. So ef-
fective has been this method of dealing with professional conduct
that in the first three and one-half years after its adoption three
times as many disbarments took place as during the preceding 77
years of state experience.'3
Such a system incorporates all the advantages of the English
self-governing bar and provides an efficient administrative proce-
dure which England lacks. This plan has made a profound im-
pression upon the entire legal profession of the United States. It
has implemented the bar with an effective procedure by which it
is able to carry the responsibility for the proper conduct of its
members. Many states have already adopted the plan. It is under
active discussion in many others. No trend in procedural law is
more clear and definite than the movement toward the self-gov-
ernment and self-discipline of the bar.14
TYPES OF JUDICIAL SERVICES RENDERED
(a) Declaring Rights
There are no theoretical limitations upon the types of service
which the courts may render in dealing with controversies be-
tween parties. What will satisfy the people of one era may be ut-
terly inadequate for those of another. When the remedies offered
by the common law courts ceased to meet the need of the times,
the court of chancery came forward with its more flexible reme-
dies and demonstrated the inherent versatility of judicial power.
The capacity for developing new types of service has not been ex-
hausted.
There are two kinds of possible remedies-those which pre-
vent trouble and those which ameliorate or cure it or give com-
pensation for damage done. The first are much the more effective.
Judicial remedies have been largely of the latter type. The
law would not enforce or protect a right except against one who
had actually violated it, or who had gone so far as to threaten to
do so. Justice was administered only against wrongdoers. Thus,
if two persons, having made a contract, were in doubt as to its
meaning or application, and neither wished to violate its provi-
13. 11 Mich. State Bar J. 50 (1931).
14. Bar Integration Is a National Movement (1939) 22 J. Am. Jud. Soc.
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sions, there was no way in which they could obtain a decision of
the court upon which they could rely for an amicable settlement
of their difficulty. It was first necessary for one of them to break
the contract and thereby injure the other, before the controversy
would be considered and passed upon by the courts.
There is, however, no inherent reason for any such restriction
upon the exercise of judicial power. If the courts are to render
maximum service within their proper field, they should be able
and willing to take hold of controversies in their early stages, be-
fore they have resulted in injury to anyone, and to make such de-
crees determining and declaring the rights of the parties as may
be necessary for their safety and protection. Taken in time, the
issues may be kept simple and held within very narrow limits,
and the decision will almost amount to a friendly adjustment un-
der the advice of the court.
The theory of the declaratory judgment is strictly in accord
with our modern conception of the function of a civilized state,
in which the mere existence of governmental power tends to
make its exercise unnecessary, and a declaration may serve every
purpose of an order.
A request for a declaration of right plainly implies full con-
fidence that the defendant will promptly and voluntarily do his
duty as soon as the court points it out to him. It makes the law-
suit a cooperative proceeding, in which the court merely assists
the parties to settle their own differences by stating to them the
rules of law which govern them. If it appears that the plaintiff's
confidence in the defendant's readiness to do right is misplaced,
the coercive decree of the court is always ready to be promptly
issued in support of its declaration.
But there are many situations in which there is no present
possibility of developing a controversy of the conventional type,
even if a party desired to do so. In such cases he merely finds
himself in a position of uncertainty, insecurity or peril, from
which he might be rescued if the court were willing to declare
what his rights would be if he should later be subjected to the
attack which he fears.
Rights which can be exercised only at a future time will be
ascertained and declared immediately, in order to enable the par-
ties to adjust their plans accordingly. The validity or meaning of
statutes or ordinances prescribing conduct under penal sanctions
may be judicially determined without requiring persons affected
by them to act at their own risk. A party against whom another
19391
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asserts a right is no longer required to remain in a state of sus-
pense and uncertainty until that other decides whether or when
he will bring an action, but the prospective defendant may him-
self bring an action for a declaration that he is not subject to lia-
bility.
The enormous advantages to society inherent in this type of
judicial service have been so clearly demonstrated that the adop-
tion of enabling acts bids fair to become universal among the
jurisdictions of this country.', But the trend goes further. The re-
luctance with which the courts granted declaratory relief in the
earlier days of its use is disappearing. Technical considerations
no longer seem so important, and convenience and social or eco-
nomic value is becoming the real test for employing the remedy.
(b) Effecting Conciliation
There is another type of service which courts are amply
equipped to render. Conciliation as a judicial function has long
been recognized on the continent of Europe, and, in some of the
Scandinavian countries a hearing for the purpose of attempting
conciliation is required before a suit of the ordinary type may be
instituted.' 6
England never developed an interest in judicial conciliation.
English litigation was always an adversary proceeding from be-
ginning to end, in which the parties conducted hostile maneuvers
with very little advice or mediation from the court.
In the United States the English tradition has always been
strong, and the procedure of the courts was designed for the trial
of issues which were to be fought out before a judge or jury. In
a number of the municipal courts in our larger cities, conciliation
divisions for small claims have been organized and operated with
much success, 17 but there has been no effort to make conciliation a
normal function of courts of general jurisdiction.
With the growing sense of responsibility for the proper ad-
ministration of justice which characterizes the present attitude of
the legal profession in this country, there has been developed a
remarkable departure from the conventional practice of courts of
record which involves the principle of conciliation. This is the
15. Thirty-five American jurisdictions have acts authorizing declaratory
judgments, all of which were enacted within the last twenty years. See stat-
utes cited in Sunderland's Cases and Materials on Judicial Administration
(1937) 315.
16. Smith, The, Danish Conciliation System (1927) 11 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 85.
17. Smith, Justice and the Poor (1919) ch. IX; Technique of Conciliation
Developed in Milwaukee (1938) 22 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 155.
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so-called Pre-trial Procedure, which originated in Detroit and has
already been adopted in Boston and Los Angeles.18
Conciliation of the European type is a hearing which precedes
the commencement of an ordinary action, and takes place before
conciliators, not before judges of the regular courts. Conciliation
of the American small claims type is merely one feature or aspect
of the final hearing in a regular suit brought in the small claims
court. If the conciliation succeeds in that court the judgment is
by consent, but if it fails the case is then and there tried and an
ordinary judgment is rendered. In both the European and the
American small claims type of conciliation lawyers are excluded
or their presence is discouraged.
The new Pre-trial Procedure differs from both of these types.
It does not precede the commencement of an ordinary action, as
in Scandinavia, nor is it a part of the final hearing or trial as in
American small claims courts. It occupies a middle position, and
is employed after the case has been regularly brought to issue but
before it has been set for trial. And instead of being excluded, the
lawyers are required to be present.
At the pre-trial hearing the judge interrogates the lawyers
as to their real positions regarding the various matters involved
in the case. Every point upon which they are willing to agree is
noted and it is thereby eliminated from the issues in the case.
In this way, by mutual discussion, the dispute may be reduced to
a very small compass, thereby restricting the scope and expense
of the trial which may thereafter take place. Unsubstantial and
fictitious issues fade away under such a process. With individual
issues settled, the settlement of the entire case becomes less dif-
ficult, and this may occur either then and there or as a result of a
short continuance suggested by the judge for the purpose of en-
abling the parties to consider a settlement. If any issues remain
unsettled the case is set for an early trial.
The results of this new type of service offered by the court
have been very satisfactory. In 1937 out of 5,798 cases appearing
on the pre-trial docket in Detroit, 3,198 were finally settled and
disposed of there, without the necessity of any trial.19 Regarding
the other 2600 cases, which went to trial, no statistics are avail-
able to show how far the elimination of issues effected by the pre-
18. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure (1937) 36
Mich. L. Rev. 215.
19. 8th Ann. Rep. Jud. Council of Mich., p. 54.
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trial hearing reduced the time and expense of the trial, but it was
undoubtedly very substantial.
The value of pre-trial procedure is by no means limited to
metropolitan courts with crowded calendars. It is proportionally
as valuable in a small court as in a large one, for it operates upon
each separate case to effect a settlement or to eliminate those mat-
ters which ought not to be permitted to take up time and cause
expense at the trial. The new federal rules20 authorize the United
States district judges to provide for pre-trial hearings, which will
make the practice available in rural as well as metropolitan dis-
tricts.
THE SOURCES OF RULES OF PROCEDURE
What is the true source of authority for procedural law? The
administration of justice has always been a difficult and delicate
function of the state, and the complexity of its problems increases
with the development of civilization. No one can possibly under-
stand or appreciate the work of the courts who is not familiar
with the conditions under which litigation proceeds. And if a
judicial procedure is to be kept in close adjustment with the con-
stantly changing requirements of society, the regulation and de-
velopment of that procedure must be under the supervision of
those who carry on the work of the courts.
England, with its genius for government, always understood
and acted upon this principle. No legislative code of procedure
was ever imposed by Parliament upon the English courts. Even
during the stormy days of the 19th century, when popular resent-
ment against the manner of administering justice threatened to
destroy the legal profession, there was no effort to take the regu-
lation of procedure out of the control of the judges and place it in
the hands of the legislature. Every one of the procedure acts
passed during that long struggle for reform, expressly recognized
and reserved authority in the judges to make general rules and
orders, even to the extent of changing forms of proceedings estab-
lished by Parliament itself.21
The United States, on the other hand, abandoned the prin-
ciple of professional control of procedure. Under the leadership of
David Dudley Field, New York set the American pattern for the
regulation of the practice of the courts by legislative codes. The
20. Rule 16.
21. Sunderland, The Exercise of the Rule-Making Power (1926) 12 A. B. A.
J. 54&
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Field Code was adopted at the very moment when the west was
being opened and new state governments were being organized
and developed, and it was seized upon almost everywhere as an
easy solution for the problems of judicial administration.
But it has become more and more apparent that there are
grave defects in the system of legislative regulation of procedure.
Rules laid down by legislative mandate do not show that delicate
adaptability to circumstances which distinguishes a professional
technique. They embody legislative theory not judicial expe-
rience, and often tend to defeat by their crudeness and rigidity
the very purposes they are created to serve. The subtle apprecia-
tion of the conditions of litigation, which can only come to those
who spend their lives in the active administration of justice, is not
possible among the members of a popular assembly. The political
atmosphere of a legislative body is not conducive to a close and
painstaking study of an intricate mechanism. Normally legisla-
tures hesitate to make important procedural changes, because
they lack technical information, with the result that the practice
in many states has fallen into a state of obsolescence.
Faced with these considerations the American legal profes-
sion has been driven to a re-examination of the problem of pro-
cedural regulation. The success of the English courts has particu-
larly directed attention in this country to the advantages of regu-
lation by rules of court, and a steadily increasing number of states
have enacted statutes authorizing their highest courts to promul-
gate general rules of judicial procedure. Many of them have gone
so far as to grant absolute rule-making power. Three of these,
Indiana, South Dakota and Pennsylvania, took that step during
the year 1937.22 Many others have authorized the courts to make
rules not inconsistent with the statutes. The trend toward judicial
regulation of procedure is clear and unmistakable.
But experience with the court rule system has developed an
inherent weakness. It has been found that the courts lack incen-
tive to execute the power conferred upon them. They are fully
occupied with the strictly judicial duties of deciding cases and
determining the law, and find little time or energy to devote to
the less urgent task of regulating the practice.
Such has been the experience everywhere. Judicial neglect of
the rules in England brought the appointment of a royal commis-




sion in 1913 to see what was wrong. In its report, after suggesting
various specific changes in the rules, the Commission said:
"The question may be asked, why the delays in the admin-
istration of justice which have been so long complained of
could not have been remedied by the adoption of these pro-
posals by the responsible authorities .. without recourse to a
royal commission. We regret to say that we do not think a
satisfactory answer can be given to this question.
"Section 75 of the Judicature Act, 1873, enacts that a Coun-
cil of judges ... shall assemble once at least in every year on
such a day or days as shall be fixed by the Lord Chancellor
• . .for the purpose of considering the operation of this Act
and of the Rules of Court ....
"It appears that successive Lord Chancellors, commencing
with Lord Selbourne and continuing to the present day, have
only taken the initiative imposed on them by this section of
fixing a day for such a meeting on three occasions in thirty-
seven years. ' ' 23
American experience with rule-making by courts has been
exactly the same as that of England. The United States Supreme
Court was given power in 1792 to make rules of practice in equity
for the federal courts. 24 Thirty years went by before the court took
up this task and enacted the first set of rules. The rules of 1822
stood substantially unchanged for twenty years. Thereafter, sev-
enty years went by before the next revision was made in 1913, and
since that time the rules stood practically unchanged until the
promulgation of the new Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.
In 1916 the Virginia legislature, through the efforts of the
State Bar Association, gave the Supreme Court of Appeals full
rule-making power over the procedure in all the courts of record
of the state.25 The act provided that "the court shall prepare a sys-
tem of rules and practice and a system of pleadings, etc." The
court took no action, and two years later the legislature, possibly
to save its face, amended2 the act by substituting "may" for
"shall," but the power so conferred remained unused and unexe-
cuted. In 1928 another statute was passed,2" in a further effort to
23. Royal Commission on Delay in the King's Bench Division, Report,
pp. 41-42.
24. 1 Stat. 275 (1792).
25. Va. Acts, 1916, ch. 521, amending Va. Code § 3112.
26. Va. Code of 1919, § 5960.
27. Va. Acts, 1928, ch. 411, being § 5960-a of the Va. Code of 1930.
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enlist the help of the Supreme Court of Appeals, as a result of
which that court enacted one rule.2 8 That is all they have done
with that rule-making power, aside from certain rules respecting
the mechanics of appeals in the Court of Appeals.
In Alabama, in 1915, the legislature gave the Supreme Court
power to adopt rules for all courts of the state provided they did
not interfere with existing statutes.2 9 Nothing was ever done.
In Michigan, by the constitution of 1850,30 the Supreme Court
was given power and charged with the duty "by general rules to
establish, modify and amend the practice in such court and in the
Circuit Courts and simplify the same." It was eight years before
the first set of rules was promulgated. I do not know who pre-
pared them, but I think it probable that the Supreme Court itself
did not. By 1896, forty lears later, only a few minor changes had
been made in the practice. In that year a State Bar Association
Committee, impressed with the imperative need of doing some-
thing to modernize the practice, prepared a new set of rules and
submitted them to the court, and the court promptly adopted
them. There was no trouble about their adoption after the work
of preparation was done.
For eighteen years no further changes were made, when an-
other Bar Association Committee drew up a set of revised rules
and they, also, were promptly adopted. In 1928 the legislature
created a procedure commission which radically revised the rules.
The court adopted them and they went into effect.31 The initiative
in no case was in the court.
In New Jersey rule-making power was granted in 1912,32 au-
thorizing the Supreme Court to make rules for its own conduct
and for that of the circuit courts, common pleas courts and other
inferior courts, which should supersede prior statutes in conflict
therewith. So far as I know, there has been no substantial use
of that power.
It appears, therefore, that in theory the court is an unsuitable
agency for initiating changes in procedure, and experience has
fully demonstrated that it will not in fact do so.
These results have introduced a new problem, namely, how
can the grant of rule-making power be made effective? The solu-
28. 152 Va. p. xiv (1928).
29. Ala. Gen. Acts, 1915, No. 537.
30. Art. VI, § 5, of the present constitution (1908).
31. Court Rules of 1931.
32. N. J. Laws, 1912, ch. 231, § 32.
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tion is being sought through an auxiliary agency, to be charged
with the primary duty of studying the operation of the courts,
preparing from time to time such rules and amendments as seem
to be needed to keep the processes of litigation adequately effect-
ive, and to present them to the court for consideration and adop-
tion.
A permanent advisory committee has in some cases been ap-
pointed by the court itself. This is the plan adopted in Wisconsin,8
with very satisfactory results. In June, 1937, the legislature of
Pennsylvania, in conferring rule-making power upon the Supreme
Court of that state, authorized the court to appoint a Procedural
Rules Committee to assist it in the preparation, revision, promul-
gation, publication and administration of the rules, and the
judges, clerks, prothonotaries and other officers of the several
courts of record in the state were required to furnish to the Su-
preme Court or to the Procedural Rules Committee such statistics
and information as might be reasonably requested concerning the
administration of justice in civil actions in those courts. 4
The Supreme Court of the United States, in June 1935, ap-
pointed an advisory committee to assist it in preparing the new
rules for the United States district courts, and the American Bar
Association, at its meeting, held in Kansas City, in September,
1937, adopted a resolution recommending that the Advisory Com-
mittee should be made permanent. 5
In some states a judicial council has been created, to make a
continuous study of the judicial system and to report to the legis-
lature or to the court, from time to time, its recommendations as
to needed improvements in the means and methods of administer-
ing justice.
An auxiliary agency of this general type will also serve an-
other exceedingly important purpose. The courts themselves
should be protected from public criticism in their strictly judicial
work. Their function is to impartially declare the law, not to
please the parties or support special interests. It is a delicate
question how far political attacks upon the judgments of courts
can be carried without undermining confidence in the courts
themselves. Certainly it would be sound policy to remove the
courts as far as possible from political controversy by relieving
them of non-judicial duties likely to arouse criticism. It is the
33. Wis. Stat., 1935, § 251.18.
34. Pa. Laws, 1937, No. 392.
35. 62 A. B. A. Rep. 690 (1937).
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delay, expense, technicality and uncertainty of litigation, rather
than the legal quality of judicial decisions, which dissatisfies the
public with the administration of justice. If the courts are to be
responsible for both the methods employed and the judgments
rendered, public criticism directed against them in respect to the
former function will react against them in respect to the latter.
On the other hand, by relieving them of administrative duties
which arouse popular complaints, they will be able to perform
their strictly judicial duties in an atmosphere much less violently
charged with political controversy.
This point has not been overlooked in England in the struggle
to find some way of freeing the courts from the shackles of an
impractical procedure. The Solicitors' Journal (November 26,
1921) presents the reasons for a separate administrative organi-
zation for regulating the business of the courts as follows:
"... . The conditions that have brought about reform in the
Navy and Army require to be brought to bear upon the Judi-
cature in order that it may come under the same beneficial in-
fluences. These reside primarily in the fact that.., naval and
military administration . . . comes under public comment and
stimulus. No such system prevails with regard to the Judica-
ture. The Lord Chancellor, . . .as head of the Judiciary ...
exercises an unquestioned . . . authority, and so is himself re-
moved, as are all the functions which he exercises removed,
from parliamentary review and comment.
"The fact is that the offices of the Lord Chancellor as they
affect. .. the Bench and the Woolsack are.., at variance with
those which touch the services of the Judicature .... If the
services of the Judicature are to meet public expectations, it
is required of him that he should hold himself liable to attack
when they fall below the standard set. The immunity from
attack he now enjoys is at the root of the inadequacy of the
services.... We have, in fact, a situation in which matters of
organization and procedure in the law are left, as far as the
public is concerned, very much to take their course. And yet
organization and procedure are at the root of efficiency in the
law."
A judicial council or an advisory committee charged with
public responsibility for devising efficient machinery for litiga-
tion and a proper organization for the various administrative
agencies which are involved in the work of the courts, would sub-
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stantially meet the need here suggested. It would relieve the
courts from duties which would tend to produce embarrassment
and impair the public confidence which they ought to enjoy.
THE PROBLEM OF PLEADING
Nothing in the history of the law has proved more burden-
ome to the bench and bar and more exasperating to the public
than the technique of pleading. It has been the traditional theory
of our law that the pleadings constitute a necessary, and at the
same time a sufficient and satisfactory, basis for the trial or hear-
ing of the case. Their function is to set forth the contentions of
the parties in such a way as to fully disclose the nature and scope
of the controversy.
In the system of pleading employed at common law, there
were a number of glaring departures from this ideal, such as the
rule which permitted affirmative defenses to be shown under gen-
eral issues without the slightest warning to the plaintiff, and the
rule authorizing the use of the vague conclusions of the common
counts which gave no intimation of the real issues. But it was,
nevertheless, the general design both at law and in equity, that
every assertion of either party should be met by an admission or
denial from the other, so that an inspection of the pleadings
would make it possible to ascertain exactly what each party
would be required to prove in order to succeed. By confining the
trial within the issues raised in the pleadings the law sought to
enable each party to prepare his case with full confidence that he
would neither be surprised by unexpected evidence from his ad-
versary nor be burdened with the expense of assembling unneces-
sary proof.
This highly desirable aim has never been possible of realiza-
tion, and pleadings never have offered and never can offer a satis-
factory basis for the trial. There are two reasons for this.
In the first place, allegations in pleadings are required to deal
with facts of a generalized type, known as material or ultimate
facts, and not with evidence. How these ultimate facts will be
proved at the trial cannot be determined from the pleadings. If
proof of one kind were to be offered, certain evidence would be ne-
cessary to meet it, whereas to oppose proof of another kind an en-
tirely different line of evidence might be necessary. For example,
the allegation of a promise by the defendant might be proved in
any one of a dozen different ways-by letters, by telegrams, by
oral conversations, through the act of this or that agent, by ratifi-
[Vol. I
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cation; but the defendant can form no idea from the pleadings
which kind of evidence will be used, and the less the claim rests
upon a foundation of fact, the more difficult will be the task of
preparing evidence to meet it.
In the second place, a pleader may allege many things that he
knows perfectly well may not or cannot be proved, since he is free
to claim what he will. This may be due either to abundant
caution in asserting every possible fact in behalf of his client, or
to a more or less definite design, well understood and highly re-
garded in military circles, of concealing the real point of attack
by a show of activity on a wide front. But whatever the motive,
the effect is the same. The other party has no way of determin-
ing from the pleadings what facts will actually become the sub-
jects of proof and what will be merely ignored at the trial.
The same double uncertainty inheres, for obvious reasons, in
the denials which the pleader employs. In the first place, denials
are no more concrete than the allegations to which they are di-
rected, and it is therefore impossible to know in advance what
sort of evidence will be employed in their support. In the second
place, they may or may not be used for the bona fide purpose of
contesting the truth of all the allegations denied. Whether gen-
eral or specific in terms they are likely to present numerous is-
sues which, although they seem genuine on their face, will be
found at the trial to be entirely fictitious. In such a case the party
having the burden of proof will be loaded with the useless
expense of proving or preparing to prove facts which his adver-
sary has no actual intention of disputing.
On account of these characteristics of pleading, by virtue of
which assertions and denials may be set up with no indication
either as to the manner in which they will be supported by proof
nor even as to which of them will be supported at all, counsel are
faced with a disagreeable dilemma in preparing for trial with no
guide but the pleadings.
If a lawyer undertakes to so prepare his case as to meet all
the possible items of proof which his adversary may bring out
at the trial, or to meet all the assertions and denials which his
adversary has spread upon the record, much of his effort will
inevitably be misdirected and will result only in futile expense.
If, on the other hand, he restricts his preparation to such matters
as he thinks his adversary will be likely to rely upon, he will run
the risk of being a victim of surprise.
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Is there any way of bridging this gap between what is set up
in the pleadings and what will come out in evidence? It is of
course important to know in advance the nature and extent of
your adversary's claims. This knowledge is given by the plead-
ings. But it is equally important, in preparing your proof, to
know what proof your adversary will be able to present in sup-
port of his claims and in opposition to yours. This knowledge the
pleadings do not give.
The allegations and denials in the pleadings point only to the
results which the pleader may wish to establish by his proof.
They give little or no notice of the nature of that proof. How can
,one effectively prepare to meet the proof to be offered by his
adversary if he has no reliable knowledge as to what that proof
will be?
As a contribution toward the solution of this difficulty, the
common law, after six or seven centuries of indifference or in-
competence, came forward with the feeble and restricted bill of
particulars.
Equity, which ought to have done better, refused even to
recognize the problem as a legitimate subject of judicial concern.
Bills in equity were, it is true, designed for the purpose of ob-
taining discovery as well as relief, and bills of discovery were
used in aid of actions at law. In bills of both kinds interrogatories
were set forth to which the defendant was required to make spe-
cific answers. But the discovery which was sought in equity was
not of the type which we are now discussing. It was discovery of
evidence which the pleader wished to obtain in support of his
own case, not discovery regarding the case which his opponent
might put up against him. Such discovery was not sought in order
to protect himself from surprise at the trial, nor to enable him to
avoid futile preparation to meet anticipated proof which the other
party might never present. The discovery provided by equity
was nothing but a method by which the pleader obtained admis-
sions from his adversary regarding matters which he himself, and
not the adversary, was required to prove.36
The obvious solution of this difficult problem of obtaining in-
formation necessary to prepare adequately for trial, is to supple-
ment the pleadings with a broad and liberal procedure for dis-
covery. The rapidly expanding use of this remedy is one of the
36. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery before Trial (1933) 42
Yale L. J. 863.
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most striking developments in contemporary procedural law.87 A
dozen states have abandoned the chancery restrictions, and au-
thorize unrestricted mutual discovery, for defense as well as for
attack. Not only may it be employed to aid parties in assembling
their own proof but also to protect them from surprise and to re-
lieve them from taking unnecessary and useless precautions to
meet evidence that will never be offered. Simple and convenient
methods are being devised for taking discovery depositions both
on oral examination and by written interrogatories, on mere no-
tice and without any order of the court. Such depositions when
taken offer an invaluable security against subsequent loss of evi-
dence. Inspection of documents may be had, with opportunity for
copying or photographing. In a number of jurisdictions property
may be inspected, and physical examination of parties may be or-
dered, and even the mental condition of a party is subject to
examination when material to the case. The new federal rules
probably go farther and provide a more effective procedure than
any system of discovery now in use.38
Unrestricted mutual discovery has been found by experience
to be one of the greatest preventives of perjury. The party is
examined early, while his memory is fresh, before he has had
time to work out a protective scheme of fictitious circumstances,
and while it is still comparatively easy to check up on his testi-
mony to ascertain how far it may vary from the truth. Coaching
of the witness by counsel in preparation for the discovery exami-
nation is much less common than coaching for the trial, so that
the testimony is more spontaneous. After the testimony has once
been taken, and a copy filed or lodged with examining counsel,
it is impossible for it to be changed to bolster up the case. This
has been conspicuously demonstrated in Massachusetts, where the
narrow chancery rule was formerly in force but was gradually
enlarged under both judicial decisions and liberal legislation un-
til discovery before trial has become as broad as examination at
the trial itself-an evolution extending through seventy years,
from Wilson v. Webber" in 1854, to Cutter v. Cooper" in 1920.
. If discovery is available to supplement the pleadings, the lat-
ter will no longer occupy the position of extreme importance to
87. Ragland, Discovery before Trial (1932).
38. Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States,
Noo. 26-37.
39. 68 Mass. 558 (1854).
40. 234 Mass. 307, 125 N.E. 634 (1920).
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which they have been assigned for the last five hundred years.
Emphasis will shift, as it ought to do, from the form of the allega-
tions to the character of the proof.
CONCLUSION
Typical of the new spirit with which the legal profession has
assumed its role of responsible leadership in improving the ad-
ministration of justice, is the recent program launched by the
American Association. A new section, on Judicial Administration,
was created at the 1937 annual meeting of the Association.41 It was
immediately organized into seven committees, each assigned to
one of the important departments in the field of procedural law.
Four hundred lawyers and judges accepted positions as active or
advisory members of those committees, representing all the states
of the Union. They undertook a systematic study of the problems
of Administrative Tribunals, Judicial Administration, Appellate
Practice, Pre-trial Procedure, Evidence, Trial by Jury and Trial
Practice. Their conclusions will represent the best judgment of
the bench and bar of the United States as to ways and means for
making the administration of justice more effective, and their
recommendations may be expected to receive the vigorous and
sustained support of the legal profession.
41. 24 A. B. A. J. 5 (1938).
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